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ON KEEPING THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL
Peter H. Lousberg
I. Introduction
The civil jury in American jurisprudence has had a long and successful
tradition. As a judicial tribunal,' it has reached out from the courtroom to
take a cross-section of the community for its members, placing them at the
heart of the administration of justice.2 As a dynamic force it has shaped much
of our law, accommodating and implementing social and economic develop-
ment through eras as critical as our own- though the remote problems of
ancestors printed on the pages of history seldom seem as urgent. In recent years,
however, debate over whether the civil jury system can effectively continue to fill
these important roles in contemporary society has resulted in a legalistic tennis
match. At stake is the existence of the civil jury system itself. Observers must
be ready to instantly turn their heads from the proponents to the opponents as
arguments are smashed across the dividing line. While the advantage surges
back and forth, employment of the civil jury continues. It is the purpose of
this article not merely to give this author another serve in the match, but rather
to evaluate some of the criticisms already made and to examine the prospects
of resolving the controversy.
Supporters of the system look upon the individual juror's participation irr
the processes of justice as gainful experience for himself and society. It is asserted
that the presence of the jury in the courtroom serves as a buffer between society
and the judge, the personification of the strict letter of the law. These proponents
also consider the civil jury a guarantor of integrity, reasoning that it is more
difficult to influence twelve jurors than a single judge.
Critics of the system counter that it is unfair, economically and socially, to
require a citizen to serve as a juror. They also claim that exposure to jury service
disenchants the citizen while corroding competence in the administration of
justice. The hard core of the criticism of the civil jury, however, consists of two
general propositions: first, that the ordinary juryman is not competent to handle
complicated cases; second, that the system is objectionable because it is a source
of economic waste.
* Member, Illinois Bar, American Trial Lawyers' Association; A.B., Yale University,
1953; LL.B., Notre Dame Law School, 1956; partner, Moran, Klockau, McCarthy, Schubert
& Lousberg, Rock Island, Illinois.
1 Modem jurors are triers of fact. Jurymen at early common law were essentially wit-
nesses called from the venire for their personal knowledge of the controversy. P. FRANCES,
HOW TO SERVE ON A JURY 52 (1953).
2 The idea of employing the citizen in the administration of justice is neither new nor
attributable solely to the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. Aristotle, discoursing on
the qualities of a citizen, recognized a value in utilizing him as an instrument of justice.
mhe citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense ... and
his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in
offices.
He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration
of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state
is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. ARISTOTLE, POLiTiCS, bk. III,ch. 1.
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Those who voice the first criticism decry the juror's lack of expert knowl-
edge. They claim that a juror is incapable of accurate judgments in complicated
cases and that he is easily confused and bewildered by the use of conflicting
expert opinions on issues of fact that are beyond his personal understanding.3
It is a fact that juries do try the more complex cases.4 This is only logical, since
the very fact that a case is not settled and comes before a civil jury imports some
note of difficulty in the case. Often complex liability or damage questions cannot
be resolved by opposing counsel. They are then submitted to a jury for the
solution that the parties could not reach. Such evidence as there is indicates
that criticism of the civil jury's competence in handling complex cases is not
valid. In a thorough empirical study of the jury system conducted by the
University of Chicago Law School, some 4000 civil jury cases were analyzed.5
Although a final report has yet to be published, enough of this study has been
revealed in other publications to refute those critics attacking the jury's com-
petence.
Continuing their line of reasoning the critics say that a judge, replete with
the qualifications of legal training and expertise derived from experience, would
be better able than a jury to solve these otherwise insolvable controversies. Cer-
tainly a judge would be faced with the same complexities involved in the litiga-
tion as would a civil jury. As Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., one of the guiding
forces behind the Chicago study, has said:
When one asserts that jury adjudication is of low quality, he must be
asserting that jury decisions vary in some significant degree from those a
judge would have made in the same cases. If he denies this and wished
to include the judge, he has lost any baseline, and with it any force, for
his criticism.0
On this premise, the Chicago study employed a test whereby the presiding judge
would give his own "verdict" in jury cases. The presiding judge's conclusion
was then compared with the verdict rendered by the jury. Analysis of the data
gathered shows that the court and jury reached the same result in seventy-eight
percent of the cases.' This seventy-eight percent agreement between court and
jury is certainly more than coincidental and weighs heavily in favor of the com-
3 Other critics contend that even if jurors are competent to decide a particular case, the
cares of everyday life pressing upon the minds of individual jurors prevent them from giving
their undivided attention to the case before them. Personal experience among lawyers who
regularly try civil jury cases, however, supports the contrary conclusion. For the most part,
jurors "are highly serious and responsible toward their task and -toward the joint effort to
deliberate through to a verdict." Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil jury, 50 VA. L. Rav. 1055,
1062 "(1964).
4 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, Ta AMERICAN JURY 63 n.11 (1966).
5 The Chicago study is the first far-reaching attempt to gain empirical knowledge from the
participants in the civil jury trial. The study attempted to observe actual jury deliberation for
source material. This resulted in a controversy over an invasion of the jury's privacy, and none
of the information so obtained has been published. None of the information suppressed, how-
ever, is likely to undermine conclusions based on results of the study which have already been
released. Id. at vi-vii.
6 Kalven, supra note 3, at'1063.
7 Disagreement between the court and the jury was experienced, therefore, in only twenty-
two percent of the samples. In the area of disagreement the jury favored the plaintiff twelve
percent of the time, while the judge favored him in the remaining ten percent. H. KALVEN &
H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 63.
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petency of the civil jury. In the area of court-jury disagreement, speculation
remains as to whether any two judges hearing the same cases would have decided
them in the same way. One need only count appellate court opinions to know
that judges disagree. Human experience would indicate that in the twenty-two
percent disagreement area, even two judges would differ.
Though the first general criticism of the civil jury system rests on a ques-
tionable foundation, the second proposition, that the civil jury is uneconomical,
is difficult to deny. A sound estimate is that a jury trial takes approximately
forty percent more time than a nonjury trial.' This affects not only jurors, but
attorneys, litigants and the courts as well. For it is well known that courts in
many of the larger metropolitan areas in the United States are faced with a
horrendous backlog of cases- many of them ordinary personal injury suits.
Reported delays range from three months in the Superior Courts of San Fran-
cisco to over five years in the Circuit Courts of Cook County, Illinois.'
This formidable barrier to the efficient dispatch of justice has led some
critics to propose abolishing the civil jury outright, at least in automobile acci-
dent cases, by the introduction of personal injury compensation plans which
eliminate the necessity of trial by jury."0 These threats to the jury system are,
in large part, attacks upon our system of fault-oriented jurisprudence itself."
The legal concepts of negligence, fraud, deceit, and defamation, to name but
a few, depend upon a judgment of culpability. And because so much of the
modern jury's justification depends upon its fault-finding function, 2 any reso-
lution of the debate surrounding the civil jury requires a value judgment on
8 Kalven, supra note 3, at 1059.
9 Eighteen courts across the country reported delays of more than 30 months for the
year 1966. Court Congestion In Slight Decline, TRIAL, Aug./Sept., 1966, at 8.
10 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VicTiM (1965);
see also Keeton & O'Connell, The Basic Protection Plan for Traffic Accident Losses, 43 NOTRE
DAmE LAWYER 184 (1967). Keeton and O'Connell propose a plan that would retain trial by
jury only where actual out-of-pocket expenses, not compensated by other sources, exceed
$10,000 and tort damages for pain and suffering exceed $5,000. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIM 274-76 (1965). In arriving at their plan, Keeton
and O'Connell discuss: the Columbia Plan (scheduled benefits); the Saskatchewan Plan (sched-
uled limited benefits); Green's Loss Insurance Plan (comparable to workmen's compensation
except applicable to motor vehicle accidents); Ehrenzweig's "Full Aid" Insurance Plan (sched-
uled benefits). The plan which Keeton and O'Connell propose is unique in its recognition
of the importance of offering compensation for pain and suffering. Id. at 441-44.
11 See Keeton & O'Connell, The Basic Protection Plan for Traffic Accident Losses, 43
NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 184 (1967). In addition to eliminating liability based on fault, com-
pensation plans would greatly modify the platform from which damages are derived. In none
of the compensation plans except the one proposed by Keeton and O'Connell is pain and suf-
fering a compensable item. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM 441-44 (1965). Compensation would be largely limited to lost wages and medical
expenses, a limitation that is highly questionable. As Jacob Fuchsberg has recently pointed out:
Pain and suffering, as an element of damages, has come to have a meaning
embracing far more than its literal and traditional reference to man's sensitivity to
physical pain and mental anguish. Under its umbrella, there has been gathered a
host of consequential or additional losses, some difficult of more exact classification.
Included are such realities as: the evaluation of specific injuries; impaired earning
capacity (as distinguished from loss of earnings); destroyed activities of daily living
loss of capacity to enjoy life and its relationships and what some scholars have termed
loss of dignity.
Unless man does live by bread alone, these are vital. They are the intangibles of
our way of life.
Fair recompense for such hardships was long in coming. The ideal of the law is
full justice. Fuchsberg, "Basic Protection" or Basic Justice?, TRIAL, Feb./Mar., 1967,
at 3.
[February, 1968]
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our society's commitment to the idea of fault as a basis of liability. As one
proponent of the civil jury system has stated, in discussing auto accident com-
pensation plans,
[t]he reform is aimed not at the jury, but at the substantive criteria for
determining what compensation, if any, accident victims are to receive.
The serious arguments for substantive change would remain the same had
the jury never been involved in these cases. The target of reform is the
uneven incidence of common-law compensation. Further, the hope of such




Those who would abolish, or substantially restrict, the civil jury face for-
midable, though not insurmountable, constitutional barriers. While the seventh
amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in civil lawsuits in federal courts,
it does not compel the states to do the same. 4 Most states, however, do guar-
antee a right to trial by jury in civil cases, though constitutional provisions vary
widely. In those jurisdictions that constitutionally guarantee trial by jury in
such cases, direct legislative attempts at abolition would undoubtedly fail. Any
direct attack would have to follow the route of constitutional amendment.
Advocates of the proposed plans for automobile accident compensation
use a more subtle approach. They base the validity of their plans on the legis-
lature's ability to circumvent constitutional requirements of civil jury trials and
find ample precedent for this indirect approach in the history of the workmen's
compensation legislation. In this legislation, two approaches were used to skirt
the constitutional obstacle of the right of trial by jury. One method was to make
the compensation plan elective, so that anyone who elected to proceed under
the statutory remedy waived, at least implicitly, his right of trial by jury. Under
the second approach coverage was compulsory, but the abolition of the right of
trial by jury was sustained as an exercise of the state's police power to replace
or abolish an entire cause of action.
The experience of Illinois serves as a good illustration of both theories. 5
That state's first workmen's compensation statute was construed to be elective
12 Discussing a plan for the elimination of jury trials and the concomitant abolition of the
fault theory, Franklin J. Marryott stated that
to make a valid evaluation, the plan seems to call for too gigantic a step. It lacks
the "awkward poetry of the envolved." Its logic seems too unmitigated by long ex-
posure to the glare of life as it is in the actual workings of the present system. It
is not the sort of modification or improvement of the automobile tort system that can
be taken in stride by the Bar, the insurance companies, the courts or the general
public. Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-
O'Connell Proposal, 52 A.B.A.J. 639, 643 (1966).
13 Kalven, supra note 3, at 1057.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. E.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833);
Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. 532 (1874); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Olesen v.
Trust Co., 245 F.2d 522, 524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1957).
15 Illinois will be referred to throughout this article. The author believes that its experi-
ence epitomizes many of the problems which the civil jury system faces today. Illinois is further
exemplary in that it has recognized these problems and has attempted to solve them.
(Vol. 43 :344]
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in Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Company."6 In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court
sustained the validity of the statute with this language:
Were the act deprived of its elective feature and made compulsory upon
every employer and employee ... very different and more serious questions
would be presented. .... While the right of trial by jury is guaranteed
under our constitution, it is a right that anyone may waive if he shall see
fit, and by electing to come within the provisions of the law an employer
or employee elects, in the first instance, to submit any dispute that may
arise to a board of arbitrators without the intervention of any court or
jury.
17
When subsequent amendments made the workmen's compensation program
compulsory, the court shifted its ground but upheld the statute, saying:
Our constitution provides that the right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate, but it guarantees that right only to those
causes of action recognized by law. The act here in question takes away
the cause of action on the one hand and the ground of defense on the other
and merges both in a statutory indemnity fixed and certain. If the power
to do away with the cause of action in any case exists at all in the exercise
of the police power of the State, then the right of trial by jury is therefore
no longer involved in such cases. The right of jury trial being incidental
to the right of action, to destroy the latter is to leave the former nothing
upon which to operate.'
By using the rationale adopted to uphold workmen's compensation legis-
lation, fixed compensation plans in automobile accident cases would have a
smooth road to constitutional validity because of the state's power to control its
highways. For when individuals use the roads, they do so by way of a privilege
granted by the state. It is then but a simple step for the state to set up condi-
tions to that privilege. In fact, the compensation plan which is currently receiv-
ing the most attention, the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan, depends
in part on this rationale.'"
Those advocating the outright abolition of the civil jury really have but one
avenue open to them, eradication by constitutional amendment. And the possi-
bility of that happening must be termed slight. The advocates of indirect change,
however, might well be able to achieve their objectives without constitutional
amendment. In a sense, this situation is unfortunate, for advocates of direct
abolition would, of necessity, present to the electorate the question of whether
the jury should continue deciding accident cases. The advocates of the auto-
16 261 Ill. 454, 104 N.E. 211 (1914).
17 Id. at 465-66, 104 N.E. at 216.
18 Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. 167, 176, 125 N.E. 748, 751-52
(1919). See also Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842 (1956);
Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952) (discussing the
history of the legislation in Illinois from the elective position to the compulsory position).
19 That plan envisions substituting for most of the automobile accident cases a complicated
series of compulsory and elective insurance benefits. Legislative action would impose a basic
insurance protection program upon the owner and operator of a motor vehicle. The program
has, as a condition precedent, the acceptance of certain prescribed benefits. Without the in-
surance, the motorist could not operate his motor vehicle in the state.
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mobile compensation plan would not give the voter this choice but would make
their appeal to the legislatures of the various states.2"
III. Modernizing the Civil Jury Trial
Although there is some merit in the criticism of the civil jury trial, the
solution is certainly not abolition of the jury. For the prospects of change by
abolition of the civil jury trial are either remote, impractical or undesirable.
What, then, can be done? The solution, according to Justice Tom C. Clark,
recently retired from the United States Supreme Court, is to "try other methods
and techniques to modernize and streamline the system."-1 Many innovations,
some still under study, others which are already in use, demonstrate that change
and modernization to meet present needs are possible within the civil jury system.
The more important methods and techniques of improving and revitalizing the
system can be better discerned by dividing the civil jury trial into three parts:
the period during which the jury is constituted; the time of preparation for the
jury trial; and the time of the trial itself.
A. Constituting the Civil Jury
Many different devices have been employed in the selection and summon-
ing of juries, with practices varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. While the
right to have a jury lawfully selected is substantial, and justice requires it not
be denied, no one method of selection is constitutionally required.2"
1. The Jury Commission
Under earlier practice, selection of veniremen was a mechanical process.
Little, if any, effort was made to screen jurors in advance. The question of their
qualifications was left to the attorneys at time of trial on voir dire examination.
Critics concluded, with some merit, that such a system is haphazard and time
consuming. It places a time burden on the court, jurors, attorneys and litigating
parties. This burden can be relieved and a great improvement in quality
achieved simply by not calling unqualified persons to act as jurors. Thus, the
jury commission system was devised to weed out incompetents from potential
jurors.
The introduction of the commission was met with constitutional objections
based on an asserted deprivation of the right of trial by jury. The courts, how-
ever, stressing the economy of the commission system, have upheld its consti-
tutionality.2" Today, jury commissioners are used to summon and select jurors
20 TRIAL, Apr./May, 1967, at 5 (reports the action of the Massachusetts Legislative In-
surance Committee).
21 Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, 1 VALPARAISO L. REv. 6-7 (1966).
22 People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 52 N.E. 572 (1899); People ex rel. Henderson v.
Onahan, 170 Ill. 449, 48 N.E. 1003 (1897).
23 People ex rel. Lasecki v. Traeger, 374 Ill. 355,,29 N.E.2d 519 (1940); People v. Bain,




in at least thirty-four jurisdictions," and the trend appears to be toward their
wider use.
The jury commission employs pre-selection questionnaires for prospective
jurors. A citizen summoned to jury duty, upon reporting to the commission
office, receives a set of questionnaires that investigates his background. The
investigation covers the statutory qualifications and determines if he possesses
sufficient qualities of intelligence, experience, and education to be a satisfactory
juror.2 5 Pre-selection investigation of jurors may be even more intensive. Cali-
fornia, for example, employs a system of investigation authorizing a combination
of personal interviews, written examinations, questionnaires and intelligence
tests. 6 There is a danger, however, in being too exclusive in the standards of
acceptance. If an actual community standard is to be sought in the adjudication
process, pre-selection should not be so restrictive that only a small segment of
the community is represented in the end product. Care in establishing guidelines
for the commission's selection of jurors is essential."
In 1962, the Illinois Judicial Council studied the feasibility of wider use
of the jury commission system. Its report, coming down decidedly in favor of
the system, stated:
It was the opinion of the Committee then that a more representative class
of juror was produced under the Commission System, that the Commission
System avoided a continued duplication of members of Grand Juries, that
it avoided the continued presence of old and retired persons as members
of Petit Juries who had been selected by members of the Board of Super-
visors in payment of small political obligation, that under the Commission
System jurors could be selected to serve at particular seasons of the year
which did not interfere with their occupations and employment, that the
citizens of the county generally under the Commission System had the
greater opportunity to serve on juries, that physically unfit persons were
eliminated by the Commission before they were called as jurors, and that
a Commission produced a more truly representative class of persons for
service. 28
Where it has been adopted, the jury commission system works effectively
and economically. It has been endorsed and recommended for areas where
it is not used. Most importantly, if it is employed as a selection method, the
result is an interested and experienced juror of higher caliber.
2. Jury of Less Than Twelve
Regardless of the method of jury selection, there will be significant benefits
in efficiency and economy if the number of jurors can be reduced. Traditionally
there have been twelve jurors, but must this be so? At the outset, it must be
24 A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINIsTRATION 185 (1949).
25 Id. at 183.
26 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 204(c).
27 See Fuchsberg, Democratizing the Jury, TRIx, June/July, 1967, at 3. See also P.
FRANCES, How TO SERVE ON A JURY '(1953), for a study of statutory standards relating to
qualifications for jury duty.
28 ILL. JuD. CONF. REP. 107. Illinois, in 1967, widened the use of the jury commission.
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admitted that constitutional problems can abound in an attempt to reduce the
size of juries. Very often, any attempt to try a case before a jury of less than
twelve would be unconstitutional. Again Illinois can serve as an example. Its
constitution requires a jury of twelve in all cases except those tried before a
Justice of the Peace.29 In spite of this constitutional provision, however, Illinois
has been conducting an interesting experiment in the use of less than twelve
jurors in the civil system. Although, the Illinois Constitution provides the right
to a jury trial by twelve jurors, a litigant can, of course, waive that right"0
Under this concept, parties before the municipal court of the City of Chicago
may waive the jury of twelve for the opportunity for trial by six jurors. The
jury fee for trial by six is fifty dollars; the fee for a jury of twelve is one hundred
dollars. Thus, the party electing to demand trial by jury, whether it be plaintiff
or defendant, is forced to make an economic as well as a tactical judgment. If
the fifty dollar fee is paid, the party is held to have elected a trial by a jury
of six."' The 1967 Illinois legislature expanded this concept to cases throughout
the state not exceeding $10,000.
The economy of a trial by a jury of less than twelve extends considerably
beyond the mere saving of fifty dollars, however. The time required for the
trial itself is lessened substantially. For the number of jurors initially called is
reduced, and time spent on voir dire is decreased. The Illinois Judicial Con-
ference concluded that the following benefits resulted from using a six man jury:
(a) There is the obvious saving of jury man power.
(b) It required approximately 40% less judge and lawyer time to select
a jury of six compared to a jury of twelve.
(c) There are financial savings of jury fees, food, records, bailiffs, clerks
and other supporting personnel.
(d) There are space savings because the physical facilities for six man
juries and its supporting personnel need be less extensive.
29 The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate; but the trial
of civil cases before Justices of the Peace by less than twelve men may be authorized
by law. ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 5.
In Liska v. Chicago Railways Company, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The right of trial by jury constitutionally guaranteed is the right as it existed at
common law and as it was enjoyed at the time of the adoption of the present consti-
tution. It is the right to have the facts in controversy determined . . . by twelve
impartial jurors who possess the qualifications and are selected in the manner pre-
scribed by law. 318 Ill. 570, 583, 149 N.E. 469, 476 (1925).
30 Constitutional prohibitions against using less than twelve jurors have been met in other
states in various ways. Some states amended their constitutions to do so. Other state constitu-
tions have provided initially for a trial in civil matters by less than twelve jurors. For example,
New Jersey's Constitutions states:
The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the legislature may authorize the
trial in civil causes by a jury of six persons when a matter in dispute does not exceed
Fifty Dollars. N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
Idaho has a similar provision which sets the jurisdictional limits at five hundred dollars.
IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7. Utah's Constitution provides, except in capital cases, that a jury
shall consist of eight persons and in courts of inferior jurisdiction of four persons. UTAH
CONST. art. 1, § 10. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the parties, by stipulation,
to submit the issues to a jury of less than twelve. The Rules make no attempt to prescribe
how many jurors must be used (or indeed what percentage of the jurors hearing the case
must agree on a verdict). FnD. R. Civ. P. 48. This is about the only means that could be
employed in view of the seventh amendment.
31 See People ex rel. Flanagan v. McDonough, 24 Ill. 2d 178, 180 N.E.2d 486 (1962);
Huber v. Van Schaack-Mdutual, Inc., 368 Ill. 142, 13 N.E.2d 179 '(1938). The rationale was




(e) Most importantly, in the thoroughly considered opinion of the judges
with experience in depth with the use of a six man jury, the plaintiffs and
defendant receive as good composite justice from a six man jury as they do
from a twelve man jury.3 2 (Emphasis added.)
The Conference also reported that even before the imposition of the fee differ-
ential between a jury of six and a jury of twelve, the demand for six man juries
ran three to one over the demand for twelve man juries. They further report,
though citing no statistics, that since the imposition of the fee differential, the
demand for six man juries has risen substantially above the three to one ratio.3"
A civil jury of less than twelve has much to recommend it. It is a time
saver. Yet it retains the desirable qualities of a trial of factual issues by a jury
of laymen rather than by a panel of experts or the judge alone.
3. Alternate Jurors
In constituting a civil jury, some jurisdictions authorize one or two extra
jurors as alternates." The Federal Rules authorize up to six alternate jurors.
3 5
These additional jurors are chosen after the jurors who are actually going to
render the verdict. They are subject to the same voir dire examination and
recite the same oath as the jurors actually selected to sit. The additional or
alternate jurors then hear the evidence and take part in the entire jury trial
until the point of deliberation.
The purpose of additional or alternate jurors is to preserve a jury's time.
In the event that one of the regular jurors becomes ill or must be excused by
the court, the legally required number of jurors can still be instructed and
retired to the jury room to reach a verdict. Thus, if two or three days of trial
have taken place before a juror is excused, this time is not lost to the court and
jury. An alternate juror merely steps into the absent juror's place. 6 A provision
for alternate jurors, then, is a relatively inexpensive expedient to insure that a
jury's expenditure of time is not wasted."
4. Less Than Unanimous Verdicts
Hung juries have been a small but nonetheless troublesome source of delay
in the civil jury system. For the calendar year 1965, the various trial courts
throughout the State of Illinois reported 3,754 law jury cases to the court
administrator. Of that number, only 25 cases resulted in mistrials because of
jury disagreement. However, these 25 cases accounted for a loss of 174 "jury
one-half days." These lost jury half-days also meant lost half-days by the judges
32 1962 ILL. JuD. CONF. REP. 64.
33 Id. For authorities on constitutionality, see Annot., 32 A.L.R. 865 (1924).
34 E.g., ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 110, § 66(2) (1956).
35 FED. R. Grv. P. 47(b).
36 The federal position, allowing six alternates, is a result of experience with the more
lengthy cases, which proved two alternates to be inadequate. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 47(b) (notes
of advisory committee on rules).
37 Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1288 (1962).
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plus, the report indicates, four additional half-days lost by the judges.18 In 1964,
out of 4,229 cases reported, only 43 resulted in mistrials because of jury dis-
agreement. These 43 cases, however, resulted in a loss of 252 jury and judge
half-days, with an additional 22 lost half-days by the judge.s9 The Illinois
Judicial Conference reported 19 jury disagreements, constituting 88/2 lost days
for both judge and jury, in the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County
for the period between August 1961 and March 1962. There were 241 law jury
verdicts in those courts during the same period. Thus, the hung jury cases con-
stituted 8 percent of the law jury verdicts. Considered this way, the problem of
the hung jury assumes considerable significance.4"
The solution for the deadlocked jury is, quite logically, a less than unani-
mous verdict. The idea is not novel, for eighteen different jurisdictions already
permit less than unanimous jury verdicts in civil matters."' Granting that the
requirement of unanimity should be set aside, one must next determine what
proportion of the jury need agree before a verdict can be rendered. In answer-
ing this question, it should be noted that the requirement of a unanimous
verdict inherently leads to deliberation. Thus, the lower the percentage of jurors
required to return a verdict, the less assurance there is of adequate deliberation.
It is obvious that a simple majority is not desirable. Under such a rule, no assur-
ance would exist that the jury would in fact deliberate the case. A jury could retire
to the jury room, take an immediate vote and report a simple majority verdict.42
Concededly, this could occur where a unanimous verdict is required, but the
probabilities are far less.
Jurisdictions permitting a less than unanimous verdict employ various
standards for insuring adequate deliberation and an exchange of ideas by the
jurors. Minnesota, for example, requires that a jury deliberate not less than
six hours before permitting a verdict by only five-sixths of the jury members. s
Where the state constitution permits a verdict by a less than unanimous
vote, legislatures are free to implement the device. Absent an express provision,
however, constitutional barriers are acute. In Illinois, as a case in point, the
right to civil jury trial is guaranteed as "heretofore enjoyed."4" The 1962 Judi-
cial Conference in Illinois concluded that "no positive or persuasive reason is
found in the histories for either the requirement of precisely twelve jurors or
38 ADm. OFF. OF ILL. CTS. ANN. REP. 57 (1965).
39 ADm. OFF. OF ILL. CTS. ANN. REP. 84(1964).
40 1962 ILL. JuD. CONF. RP. 65. See also Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury, 48
CHICAGO BAR Rcopm 195, 200 (1967), where the authors' study of criminal cases showed
5.6 percent hung juries in states which required unanimity and 3.1 percent where a majority
verdict was acceptable.
41 1962 ILL. JuD. CONF. REP. 66-69. The states are Arkansas, California, Idaho,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. This concept in
criminal matters assumes an entirely different set of values.. For a critical analysis of recent
English legislation abolishing unanimous verdicts in criminal trials, see Kalven & Zeisel, supra
note 40.
42 Apparently no jurisdiction permits a verdict by simple majority. Required proportions
run generally from two-thirds of the jury to five-sixths.
43 The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . and the legislature may
rovide that the agreement of five-sixths of any jury in any civil action or proceeding,
ter not less than six (6) hours' 'deliberation, shall be a sufficient verdict therein.
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
44 ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 5.
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for the requirement of unanimous verdicts." 5 But the conference conceded that
the constitutional situation in Illinois is probably fatal. The Indiana Supreme
Court held a statute authorizing less than unanimous verdicts unconstitutional."
Its constitutional provision, similar to that of Illinois, was interpreted to require
a civil jury of twelve jurors and a unanimous verdict because these were the
requirements which existed prior to the adoption of the Indiana Constitution."
Assessing the value of a less than unanimous verdict, the concept shows
up favorably. The Illinois Judicial Conference so strongly favored the idea
that it recommended legislative enactment of the less than unanimous verdict
in civil cases, immediate court testing of the legislation, and, in the event the
statute was declared unconstitutional, an amendment to the Illinois Consti-
tution.4 8 Ironically, in matters of law, where each decision can have much
greater importance as precedent, our jurisprudence permits a simple majority
of judges on a reviewing court to declare what the law is. Their declaration
may continue a broad legal concept in existence or may change it radically:
Yet, unanimity is not a prerequisite, not even in constitutional matters. When,
however, a factual dispute is being considered by a civil jury, or the jury is
asked to judge the conduct of a litigant, nothing less than a unanimous verdict
satisfies the dictates of justice. This juxtaposition demonstrates a basic illogic,
B. Pre-Trial Matters
The methods of pre-trial preparation do not apply solely to the civil jury
system, but are appropriate for bench trials as well. However, their existence
came about largely because of pressures generated in the civil jury field. Prep-
aration for trial by civil jury has undergone a marked change in the past twenty
years. Today discovery procedures, consisting of depositions, interrogatories,
motions to produce documents and tangible objects, requests for admission of
genuineness of documents or admissions of facts, the use of independent medical
experts, certificates of readiness and the pre-trial conference, are fruitfully
employed toward the preparation of trial or achieving settlement of cases. The
growth in the pre-trial stage of litigation gives the impression of time-lapse
photography -the experimentation, use and development of the devices grow-
ing before the observer's eyes. Pre-trial practice has moved rapidly from the
closed fist, poker player, adversary attitude to the open file, no bluffing, "let's
get the facts" approach.
1. Discovery
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided the impetus for the enlight-
ened change in the pre-trial field. A comparison of commentaries on pre-trial
discovery before the adoption of the Rules and commentaries written afterwards
amply illustrates that the "game" aspect of federal civil litigation should be
45 1962 ILL. JUD. CONF. REP. 70.
46 W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Snider, 207 Ind. 686, 194 N.E. 356 (1935).
47 Id.
48 1962 ILL. JUD. CONF. REP. 71.
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over. The "game!' aspect has been replaced by such effective tools as the dis-
covery deposition, written interrogatories and the discovery of tangible objects
and documents, which give counsel a more informed platform on which to base
a judgment and evaluate his case.49 The backlog of civil jury cases should be
reduced simply because fewer cases will reach the trial stage.
The liberality of the discovery procedures permitted by the Federal Rules
has been established for some time.50 The Rules permit inquiry
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action . . . including . .. the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground
for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial .... '11
Interrogatories may relate to any matters which may be inquired into by depo-
sition. 2 Rule 34, allowing discovery of documents, has been extended to permit
counsel to discover statements of witnesses taken by the opposition. And although
a showing of "good cause" is technically required, some cases seem to accept
any showing as satisfying that prerequisite.
5 3
Many states closely follow the Federal Rules relating to discovery and the
liberal concept behind those rules. Thus, many discovery systems require the
revelation of names of occurrence witnesses." Such a rule permits a full investi-
gation by both sides prior to trial. Similarly, discovery of whether a defendant
in a civil action has insurance covering his potential liability is permitted in
many jurisdictions.55 In People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher,5" the Illinois Supreme
Court required defendants to reveal the existence and amount of liability insur-
ance. After reviewing the conflict among various jurisdictions with regard to
this matter, the court placed Illinois among those jurisdictions requiring dis-
closure of insurance and made these comments on discovery procedures:
They were adopted as procedural tools to effectuate the prompt and just
disposition of litigation, by educating the parties in advance of trial as to
the real value of their claims and defenses. As noted by legal scholars,
those rules will suffice for present needs if lawyers and judges will use
them with an understanding of that purpose....
In the light of this approach, we must reject at once as authority
those cases limiting pretrial discovery to matters admissible in evidence
... as being contrary to both the terms and intent of the Rule.
5 7
The decision in Terry merely followed the trend, announced in Krupp v.
Chicago Transit Authority," requiring disclosure of the names of occurrence
49 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
50 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
51 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b).
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
53 Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); Johnson v. Ford, 35 F.R.D. 347
(D. Colo. 1964).
54 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
55 Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 968 (1955).
56 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
57 Id. at 236-37, 145 N.E.2d at 592.
58 8 Ill. 2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
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witnesses.5" The new Illinois Supreme Court Rules, effective January 1, 1967,
take another important step towards broader discovery. Those rules define the
scope of discovery as follows:
Except as provided in these rules, a party may obtain by discovery full
disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the parties
seeking disclosure or of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or tangible things,
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts....
All matters that are privileged against disclosure on the trial, including
privileged communications between a party or his agent and the attorney
for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any discovery pro-
cedure. Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is
subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental
impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney.
60
This language assumes even greater liberality when viewed in light of Monier
v. Chamberlain,6' decided by the Illinois Supreme Court at the same time the
court was preparing its new rules on discovery. That case permits opposing
parties to obtain copies of statements of witnesses taken by an adversary without
the prerequisite of "good cause" which is required under the Federal Rule. 2
Thus, about the only things remaining beyond the reach of opposing coun-
sel using the modem discovery methods are privileged statements from clients
and, at least for the time being, statements of nonoccurrence witnesses such as
experts. The logical end of this whole trend towards broader discovery, when
viewed with the objective of relieving court congestion, is to establish a system
of "pre-suit" discovery. Such a system would allow claimants who intended
ultimately to file suit to have limited discovery even before they file suit, upon
their giving an appropriate notice. Of course, safeguards would have to be
erected to prevent abuse, but that should not be considered an insurmountable
obstacle to this type of discovery. In evaluating the merits of such "pre-suit"
discovery it should be noted that discovery does lead to a more accurate evalu-
ation of contending claims, with a correspondingly greater number of settlements.
59 The Supreme Court of Illinois said in that case:
By its enactment . . . the General Assembly showed its purpose to broaden sub-
stantially the scope of available discovery. It acted in response to prevailing dis-
satisfaction with procedural doctrine which had exalted the role of a trial as a battle
of wits and subordinated its function as a means of ascertaining the truth. The
doctrines which thus unduly emphasized the adversary quality of litigation originated
in judicial decisions, some of which, indeed are pressed upon us by the defendant.
. . . The hostile attitude toward discovery which sired those decisions was rejected
by the General Assembly in the Civil Practice Act. "Discovery before trial" pre-
supposes a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is
admissible at the trial, but also that which leads to relevance at the trial. Id. at 41,
132 N.E.2d at 535.
60 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(1), (2).
61 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
62 Id. at 359-60, 221 N.E.2d at 416-17.
63 Such a rule might require the filing of a notice for discovery with the clerk of the
court on a special docket for a minimal fee. The notice would be comparable to that used
for depositions to preserve evidence before suit is filed.
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If court congestion is as great a problem as contended by the critics of the
civil jury system, then the idea of a "pre-suit" discovery system makes sense.
And the trend toward broader discovery is flexible enough to encompass such
an innovation.
2. Independent Medical Examinations
Another pre-trial method of cutting down the case backlog is the increased
use of independent medical experts in personal injury jury cases. Medical issues
in personal injury cases are generally time consuming and confusing to a jury.
They are made more so by the usual method by which medical evidence is
presented. For each side presents its own "expert," with each "expert" present-
ing his own diagnosis or prognosis. When the testimony conflicts, the jury is
left to weigh the truth of the statements and to wonder about the impartiality
of their proponents.
Very often these conflicts between examining doctors might be bridged
through the give and take of pre-trial negotiation. To facilitate this bridge
building, some jurisdictions have adopted an independent medical examination
rule. The essence of such a rule is that a party whose medical condition is in
issue is required to submit to a medical examination by a doctor appointed by
the court.64 While the particulars of the rules adopted in various jurisdictions
may differ,"s the philosophy behind them is the same. Their purpose is to simplify
the jury's and the court's burden by removing the element of bias present in a
partisan approach to presenting medical testimony. The independent medical
examination provides a common ground for the meeting of plaintiff and defen-
dant. Even if its use does not bring about a settlement, it will prove to be of
assistance to the jury at trial by providing an impartial perspective from which
to judge the medical situation."
64 Such an examination is to be distinguished from that provided for in the various
practice rules which give a party to a law suit the right to have his doctor examine the
opposing party. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court Rule says that the court may
upon motion "order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician
suggested by the party requesting the examination . . . ." ILL. SuP. CT. R. 215(a). The
independent medical examination rule, on the other hand, reads:
The court may on its own motion or that of any party order an impartial physical
or mental examination of a party whose mental or physical condition is in issue,
when in the court's discretion it appears that such an examination will materially
aid in the just determination of the case. The examination shall be made by a
member or members of a panel of physicians chosen for their special qualifications
by the Illinois State Medical Society. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 215(d).
65 For example, the administrative duties often lie with different persons. New York
uses a special deputy clerk, while Illinois uses a court administrator. Cuyahoga County (Rule
21 A, of the Cleveland Courts,) uses an impartial medical expert plan restricted to pre-trial
stages. The Illinois plan requires payment to be assessed by the court from a special fund or
taxed as costs. The federal courts require the litigants to pay the fees.
66 No statistics are available in any of the jurisdictions currently using the independent
medical examination plan to show how often it is being used. Experience in the use of the
plan in Illinois varies widely from circuit to circuit. In any event, it is being accepted slowly.
ADm. OFF. ILL. CTS. ANN. REP. 67 (1964). The rule in Illinois became fully implemented
on January 1, 1964, in Cook County. As of July 15, 1965, only 57 cases had employed the




A pre-trial technique with great potential for effecting a more efficient
disposition of jury and potential jury cases is the pre-trial conference.6" For
the pre-trial conference is becoming more diversified in its use and also more
effective." Again, the Federal Rules have lent the greatest impetus to the accep-
tance of this device. Rule 16 provides for a pre-trial conference at which the
court may delve into such matters as the simplification of issues, amendments
to pleadings, admission of facts and genuineness of documents, limitation on
the number of expert witnesses, the reference of preliminary issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence at trial by jury and such other matters as
may be proper.6" This rule, almost to the word, has been adopted in various
states.
70
Such pre-trial rules permit the court to enter orders which are binding on
the parties throughout the balance of proceedings. Though this feature has
been the basis for constitutional objection on the theory that the parties are
partially deprived of trial by jury, this objection has been rejected by the courts."1
The pre-trial order is considered merely a condition to, and not an abrogation
of, the right of jury trial."
Many judges use the pre-trial conference to explore a basis for settlement.
There are, however, no appreciable guidelines delineating what is the proper
extent of that exploration. Although the scope of the conference is certainly
broad, it is by no means without limitation. The court, for example, cannot use
the pre-trial conference to coerce a settlement. In People ex rel. Horwitz v.
Canel,"3 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court's pre-trial order.
The suit was against a hospital and was instituted before the doctrine of charitable
immunity was abolished in Illinois."4 The hospital carried liability insurance
of $50,000 and contended that the balance of its funds was in trust and not
subject to the satisfaction of a judgment. The insurer waived defense and
tendered the $50,000 to the plaintiff who refused to accept it. The pre-trial
order stated that if the plaintiff was awarded a verdict in excess of $50,000
and could not find non-trust funds from which to satisfy the excess, the hospital's
attorneys' fees and the expenses of litigation would have to be paid out of the
$50,000 of insurance. In holding that the trial court exceeded its authority
under pre-trial rules, the court said:
67 One commentary on Federal Rule 16 states that
[a]lready there has been enough experience with the pretrial hearings in the federal
courts to make it clear that [the] Rule . . . is capable of substantially contributing
to the efficiency of federal practice. Sunderland, The Function of Pre-Trial Pro-
cedure, 6 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 4 (1939).
68 4 Am. JuR. TRIALs 662 (1966).
69 FED. R. Crv. P. 16. The purpose of pre-trial conferences is the same under both the
federal and state rules, that is, to reduce expense and delay during trial. 4 Am. JUR. TrAs
662 (1966).
70 E.g., ILL. Sup. CT. R. 218(a).
71 State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Ct., 121 Mont. 320, 194 P.2d 256 (1948); Annot.,
2 A.L.R.2d 1061 (1948).
72 State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Ct., 121 Mont. 320, 327, 194 P.2d 256, 260 (1948).
73 34 Ill. 2d 306, 215 N.E.2d 255 (1966).
74 The charitable immunity doctrine was abolished in Illinois by Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
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Rule 22 [the pre-trial conference rule] limits a trial court's jurisdiction on
pretrial, and nothing in the rule authorizes coercion of a party into settle-
ment in an amount arbitrarily fixed by the court or the imposition of sanc-
tions on a party who refuses to settle.
7 5
Even if a settlement is not realized, the pre-trial conference may still be
advantageous. It is probably more far reaching than any other suggestion for
streamlining the jury trial, and when properly used, it greatly expedites the
process of litigation. 8 The success of the pre-trial conference, however, is totally
dependent upon the manner in which it is conducted. One court, for example,
actually set up fifty cases for pre-trial in one day.77 Under such circumstances,
pre-trial can lose its effectiveness and easily assume a circus atmosphere, with
bailiffs stationed throughout the courtroom, several judges assembled in different
chambers, numerous attorneys milling about the courtroom, and the court clerk
acting as a traffic director by calling cases and directing the responding attor-
neys to a particular judge's chamber. The attorneys, files in hand, then go
before the judge and are asked whether the case can be settled. Upon giving
a negative reply, they are promptly shuffled out as the judge puts the case on
the jury trial docket. Contrast such a parody with the effective pre-trial con-
ference where memoranda are required from all parties. The judge then reviews
the memoranda and clearly states the issues. He follows this with an inquiry
as to what elements of the case are in controversy. An order finding facts on
elements which are not disputed and exploring evidence to be presented on
controverted matters is then entered, thus relieving counsel of many unnecessary
burdens at trial.
Trial time can also be saved by the identification and marking of exhibits
at the pre-trial conference. If amendment of pleadings is necessary, it too can
be accomplished there. Finally, the court can, by private conferences with
counsel, determine how far apart the respective parties are from settlement.
Through his offices of persuasion, but not coercion, the judge can then endeavor
to bring the parties together or at least lay ground work so that the parties
themselves may work toward settlement. So conducted, the pre-trial is most
effective.
4. Certificate of Readiness
In a further attempt to encourage settlement many courts require cer-
tificates of readiness. While forms might vary from court to court, the cer-
tificate generally serves as a checklist containing the following assertions: first,
that all discovery procedures desired to be used by the party filing the certificate
75 People ex rel. Horwitz v. Canel, 34 Ill. 2d 306, 309, 215 N.E.2d 255, 256 '(1966).
76 Pre-trial conferences can cause some undesirable side effects. A pre-trial conference, to
be most effective, should be presided over by the judge who ultimately tries the case before the
jury. If the conference results in rulings on evidence, limitations on expert witnesses, or amend-
ments of pleadings, continuity ought to be retained. Experience shows, however, that this con-
tinuity cannot be retained without problems in scheduling and without a corresponding loss of
the presiding judge's availability for actual trials. See H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHxOLZ,
DELAY IN THE COURT 154 (1959).
77 While the author no longer practices in the court described, he prudently exercises his
prerogative to leave the court nameless.
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have been completed or that no discovery is anticipated; second, that settle-
ment negotiation has been pursued unsuccessfully or is not appropriate for
stated reasons; third, that the case is ready for trial. Courts employing this
type of certificate generally make its filing a pre-requisite to the placement of
the case on the trial calendar.
The usefulness of the certificate of readiness as an administrative tool is
somewhat delusive. Court administrators might seem to gain ground on back-
logs by declaring a case not ready for trial because of failure to file a cer-
tificate. This is only a short term gain, however. For the administrator has
done nothing but delay the date on which any given case shall be counted as
part of the backlog.
Putting aside administrative considerations, the usefulness of the certificate
of readiness as a device to facilitate civil jury trials, especially personal injury
cases, is questionable. It is merely another filing process, and a court can exer-
cise little control over good faith filing. If such a certificate must be filed before a
case can be placed on the jury calendar, nothing would prevent parties from
boldly filing a certificate of readiness, disclaiming any intention of pursuing
discovery and stating that settlement is not possible and that they are ready for
trial. The case would start on its course toward ultimate jury consideration
without any beneficial results having been achieved.
A study of the effectiveness of the certificate of readiness has been made.
Its conclusion, as far as civil jury cases are concerned, is that the certificate of
readiness is ineffective. This is unfortunate, for the great backlog of cases is in
civil jury matters. The general calendars, which cover all other cases, are not
so burdened. However, the empirical study of the effect of the certificate of
readiness concluded that
[t]he personal injury suits pending at the time the certificate was intro-
duced have practically all remained on the calendar. But the general cases
show a surprisingly high loss ratio: Roughly only 60 out of every 100 cases
remained on the calendar.
We must conclude then that the certificate, while it hardly affected
the proportion of personal injury filings, has impressively increased settle-
ment of general cases prior to filing.
78
The pre-trial conference with a pre-trial memorandum is more time con-
suming than the mere filing of a certificate but it is also more effective in achiev-
ing what the certificate purports to do.
5. Interest On Judgment
The traditional rule concerning interest on money judgments, normally
declared by statute, is that interest on unliquidated amounts in controversy does
not accrue until there is a judgment in a certain amount. The theory has been
proffered that if interest began to accrue sometime before judgment, defendants
who would otherwise attempt to discourage a worthy plaintiff by dragging the
78 H. ZEISEL, H. KALvEN & B. BuCHHOLZ, supra note 76, at 157-61.
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case to the rear of an overcrowded docket might be induced to settle. This theory,
together with a questionable extension of it, was recently adopted by the Mich-
igan legislature in a statute that provides:
Execution may be levied for interest on any money judgment recovered
in a civil action, such interest to be calculated from the date of filing the
complaint .... In the discretion of the judge, if a bona fide written offer
of settlement in a civil action based on tort is made by the party against
whom the judgment is subsequently rendered and the offer of settlement is
substantially identical or substantially more favorable to the prevailing party
than the judgment, then no interest shall be allowed beyond the date the
written offer of settlement is made. (Emphasis added.)7 9
By its flexibility in 'permitting or denying interest, this statute attempts to equalize
the pressures on both plaintiff and defendant. This equalization, while it may
seem only equitable, may be a defect preventing the statute from actually en-
couraging settlements. No uncertainty is removed from the evaluation of a case.
It is simply perpetuated or increased."0
This interest manipulation, moreover, has little effect in cases involving small
amounts of money, which make up the majority of tort cases. For example,
if the interest rate is five percent and the verdict $2,000, assuming that three
years elapse from the date of filing the complaint to the date of judgment, plaintiff
would be entitled to an additional $300. Thus, in the vast bulk of tort cases,
the increment in interest assumes a comparatively insignificant position."
The interest rule does not accomplish what its advocates had hoped for in
terms of encouraging settlements of law suits. In fact the evidence available
at the present time would indicate little, if any, achievement in this regard. 2
79 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6013 (Supp. 1965).
80 Some courts have employed the concept of interest from date of filing or date of injury
without legislative fiat. For instance, in actions pursuant to death on the high seas and under
the Jones Act, the interest rule was so applied as a part of "fair and just compensation for
pecuniary loss sustained." 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 688, 762 (1958). See Noel v. United Aircraft
Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1965) (relating to death on high seas); National Airlines,
Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc.,
333 F.2d 676 "(4th Cir. 1964). The theory of applying the interest rule is different in the fore-
going cases, but they do illustrate that the rule might be applied without legislative action.
81 This judgment is appropriate only in relation to the interest rule and its purpose of
facilitating settlement. It is not appropriate to the substantive considerations which hold that
an injured party, as a matter of right, ought to be paid interest from the injury or date of filing
the complaint.
82 A comparison of the number of suits filed in Massachusetts, which adopted the interest
rule in 1947, and Connecticut, which had not adopted the rule, casts doubt on the efficacy
of such a rule as a device for reducing the number of trials. Statistics indicated that Massa-
chusetts experienced a decline in the filing of new lawsuits up to the date the interest rule was
adopted. A year after the interest rule was adopted, however, the ratio of new suits to claims
increased. The state of Connecticut, used by the researchers as a control state, also showed a
decline in the number of suits filed compared to the number of claims made up to 1947. How-
ever Connecticut also noted an increase in this ratio for the year 1948, and this ratio was
comparable to the increase noted in Massachusetts. Commenting on the statistics gathered, the
researchers concluded:
Hence, it is doubtful whether the Massachusetts figures actually show an effect
of the changed interest rule. But, and this is important, if it shows such an effect it
is in the negative direction of increasing rather than of relieving the workload of the
Court. To be sure more suits do not necessarily mean more trials, but they certainly
do not mean fewer trials. Given, then, the most favorable interpretation . . . [the
statistics indicate] no effect of the new interest rule on the workload of the courts.
H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUOCHHOLZ, supra note 76, at 129-30.
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C. Conducting the Trial
Methods or techniques that can be utilized for the modernization of the
civil jury trial itself are: split trials, restricting attorneys on voir dire and the
use of uniform or pattern jury instructions.
1. Split Trials
The split trial is one of the more promising devices to modernize the con-
temporary civil jury system." Its flexibility can result in a great saving of time
and a more expeditious disposition of jury cases. However, with the exception
of the Federal Court system, it is still largely a promise.
The power of a court to exercise its discretion in ordering a separate trial
of various issues comes from either court rules or legislation. The applicable
Federal Rule reads:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, . . . or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims . . . or issues, always preserving inviolate the
right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
84
Under this Federal Rule, and similar state rules, split trials have been justified
in the following situations: where the issue of liability is a separate and distinct
question from damages, where a split trial will not operate to the prejudice of
any party to the action and where a split trial will expedite litigation or lessen
its costs. When any of these situations exist, it is generally within the trial court's
discretion to order the split trial."
Not all jurisdictions subscribe to the federal position on split trials in
personal injury cases. The Texas Supreme Court, for example, held that a
Texas statute, similar to the prior Federal Rule, 6 did not permit the trial court to
separate the issue of liability from the issue of damages. It reasoned that to hold
otherwise would allow piecemeal litigation of a single controversy. The court
also felt that the issues of liability and damages are so inextricably combined
in personal injury cases that they could not be severed for trial. 7
There is some merit to the Texas court's position. Splitting liability and
damage issues for purposes of trial can present problems. Assuming that a trial
court splits the issues and that the plaintiff is successful on the liability issue,
83 The term "split trial" refers to the power possessed by some courts of severing liability
issues from the question of damages and of dividing multiple claims and cross-claims in a mul-
tiple party case.
84 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
85 Nettles v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 234 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.
1956); Chudyk v. Fifth Ave. Coach Line, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 1003, 177 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982
(1958).
86 Prior to its amendment in 1966, Federal Rule 42(b) read:
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or any number of claims, cross-claims, counter-claims, third-party claims,
or issues. 28 U.S.C. Rule 42(b) (1964).
87 Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 '(1958).
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there arises the problem of deciding what jury is to hear the evidence on damages.
Should the same jury that decided the liability issue hear this evidence, or should
an entirely different jury assess damages? In answering this question, one must
recognize that the whole purpose of the split trial is to save time. If a different
jury is to determine damages, a second voir dire will be necessary, and valuable
time will be consumed, contrary to the very purpose of the split trial. In
O'Donnell v. Watson Brothers Transportation Company," a federal district court
held that the decision to impanel a new jury to determine damages lay within
the trial court's discretion.89 The court said, however, that using the same jury
which determined liability to hear damages should be preferred because it is a
more "expeditious, economic and less time-consuming procedure." 90  Where
the same jury is to be used, the court stated, the initial voir dire examination by
counsel should cover damages as well as liability.91
Counsel for either plaintiff or defendant may be wary of the split trial.
However, the attorneys for the plaintiff are generally the more vociferous in
their objections to it, because of their belief that evidence of the injury, pain,
and suffering sustained by the plaintiff will influence the jury to render a favor-
able verdict. The closer the question of liability, the more crucial this element
of inherent sympathy for the injured party becomes. Plaintiff's counsel can also
be expected to resist the split trial in cases where the liability issue is hotly con-
tested by arguing that the issue of liability is too intertwined with the issue of
damages to be tried separately. This argument has been recognized by the
courts when considering whether a case should be remanded for a new trial
on damage issue only. 2
The propriety of splitting issues may be difficult to determine in cases where
the liability issue is close, but this should not dissipate the value of the technique
and certainly should not deter courts from adopting the procedure. The pre-
trial conference is an appropriate time and means to explore the advisibility of
splitting the issues for trial.
2. Jury Voir Dire
After being summoned for service, the juror is tested on his qualifications
during the voir dire. The problems involved in this area are: who should inter-
rogate the jury, the judge or counsel; and the number and method of exercising
challenges.
The old method of jury examination was extremely time consuming. This
examination was counsel's first opportunity to begin "working on" the jury, and,
under a more or less hands-off policy by the court, he began his explanation of
the theory of his case during his "examination" of the jurors. This type of ex-
amination usually resulted in the attorney making a final argument and then
rejecting by peremptory challenge those jurors who did not seem to respond
properly to it.
Modern practice stands in marked contrast. Many states now have statutes
88 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. III. 1960).
89 Id. See also Hassett v. Modern Maid Packers, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 661 (D. Md. 1959).





similar to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234,"3 which requires the judge to initiate
the voir dire by identifying the parties and their counsel and by giving a brief
outline of the case. The rule also requires that the judge, not counsel, question
the jurors as to their qualifications. After the judge has completed these pre-
liminaries, he may then give counsel a reasonable opportunity to ask the jurors
questions concerning their qualifications. The rule admonishes court and counsel
that no questions on law instructions are to be permitted.
Under Federal Rule 47 the judge can employ either of two different methods
on voir dire. He may examine the jurors concerning their qualifications himself,
or he may permit counsel to do so. If the court elects to conduct the examination,
counsel must be permitted to make further "proper" inquiry. In lieu of per-
mitting counsel to ask additional questions, however, the court can require the
attorneys to submit questions to him, and then he, in turn, can ask the questions
of the prospective jurors. In this manner, the court retains a tight control over
the questioning process.
Modern practice considerably limits the number of peremptory challenges
available to each side. The amount of time required of court and counsel to
select a jury is thus shortened. Illinois, a typical example, limits peremptory
challenges in civil cases to five per side.94 When there are multiple parties on
a side, the court may allow up to three additional peremptory challenges per
party, with each side of the case - as opposed to each party in the case - having
an equal number of peremptory challenges.9 This requires a sharing of chal-
lenges among multiple parties. Finally, Illinois permits an additional peremptory
challenge for every alternate juror, but this additional challenge may be used
only in the selection of the alternate juror. 9
In view of the limited number of peremptory challenges, the manner in
which a panel of jurors is selected is crucial. Juries are selected from panels of
three, four, six or twelve. Obviously, if the court requires counsel to choose a
jury from panels of three or four, counsel must exercise his peremptory challenges
before accepting the panel; this decision is often difficult. Tactically, counsel
does not like to exhaust his peremptory challenges on one or two panels but
prefers to reserve some for later panels.
Permitting counsel to interrogate all twelve prospective jurors, or having
the court do so, before requiring the exercise of any challenges makes sense. For
it permits a more intelligent employment of the peremptory challenge. Rather
than being forced to make a piecemeal decision, perhaps leaving on an earlier
panel a juror that he would otherwise have excused if that juror had been on
the final panel interrogated, counsel can evaluate each juror relative to the
entire panel. Furthermore, permitting an examination of all twelve jurors before
requiring the exercise of challenges should not result in a more lengthy voir dire.
For the length of the jury examination will largely be controlled by the court
under the modern practice. And the court will not have any less control where
it permits an examination of a panel of twelve jurors as opposed to a panel
93 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 234.
94 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 66(l) (1956).
95 Id.
96 Id. at § 66(2).
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of three or four. The twelve-man panel thus permits a more intelligent selection
of the jury.
3. Instructing the Jury
The primary function of the jury is to decide questions of fact and to
render a verdict by applying the law to the litigants' conduct. Instructing the
jury on the law applicable to the case before them is, therefore, crucial to their
ultimate function. Improper instructions will almost invariably result in reversals.
The old practice of preparing instructions without any guide other than
past court opinions resulted in a morass of legal sophistry. Instructions became
merely another vehicle for spreading the advocate's theory of particular cases
rather than for conveying a distilled principle of law. The instructions were
complex, often nonsensical and almost uniformly boring. It is not surprising
that jurors found them confusing. A look at the reports of appellate courts
discloses just how confusing these instructions could be. Illinois' committee on
jury instructions conducted a study spanning 25 years and found that thirty-eight
percent of all cases reversed on appeal from 1930 to 1955 were reversed in whole
or in part because of erroneous instructions." This percentage represents a
staggering number of man hours, not only at the appellate level, but also at the
trial level.
Efforts have been made throughout the United States toward uniformity
in jury instructions. The movement was initiated in California," and, as of
April, 1966, uniform jury instructions were being used, either optionally or
mandatorily, in 22 of the states.9 The objective of the uniform or pattern jury
instructions is to achieve simplicity and economy of time in both the preparation
of instructions and the conference on instructions. These uniform instructions
also achieve what their name implies, uniformity from one case to the next in
matters of law."'0
Committees on uniformity try to avoid changing the law in new instruc-
tions. Regardless of the care taken, however, some of the uniform instructions
have done exactly that. In Illinois, for example, prior to the adoption of the
pattern jury instructions, it was considered error to instruct the jury on the
meaning of "intoxication" in dram shop cases.' Nevertheless, the committee
drafting uniform instructions prepared a definition of the word "intoxicated,"
while acknowledging that the instruction had not been previously approved.'
Regardless of occasional overstepping of traditional procedures, the uniform or
pattern jury instructions generally are the result of a cautious and concentrated
97 ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS Xi (1961).
98 6 Am. JUR. TRULS 929 (1966).
99 Id.
100 The aim of the drafters of the instruction was to make them conversational, understand-
able, unslanted and accurate. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS xiii (1961).
101 Shea v. LaCost, 16 Ill. App. 2d 454, 458, 148 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1958).
102 The instruction was presented to the Illinois Supreme Court, adopted by it and later
given the court's blessing by case decision. Woolley v. Hafner's Wagon Wheel, Inc., 22 Ill. 2d
413, 420, 176 N.E.2d 757, 760-61 (1961). The appellate court held, in Navarro v. Lerman,
48 Ill. App. 2d 27, 36, 198 N.E.2d 159, 163 (1964), "that an instruction defining intoxication
is proper in a dramshop case and we hold further that IPI No. 150.15 is a good definition of a
term which is difficult to accurately define."
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effort by knowledgeable committees. The end product is, from an over-all
assessment, beneficial.
IV. Conclusion
The civil jury system has been serving our society for many centuries.
It has worked. It admittedly has shortcomings, but so would any system of
resolving human disputes. The alternatives to the jury system are bench trials
or administrative hearings. These alternatives, however, do not overcome the
shortcomings of the jury but merely replace them with similar shortcomings.
For example, under the jury system, there is the possibility of a bored jury.
However, there is also the possibility of a bored judge or administrator. Though
the jury may not be composed of trained experts, the expertise provided by
bench trials and administrative hearings is counterbalanced by the danger of
judges and examiners who have become calloused by constant exposure to the
judicial process. Viewing too many injuries and hearing too many cases can
produce a stilted cynicism just as easily as it can produce an economical, in-
expensive and rapid determination of private rights.
The argument concerning the retention or abolition of the civil jury has
been going on for many years and shall continue. While the argument progresses,
so does the civil jury system. Very real modifications have been and will con-
tinue to be made in the system. Some of the innovations have greater merit
than others, but the important thing is that the awakening has come. It is with
these attempts at modernization that the ultimate resolution of the argument will
lie. For if the civil jury system can be modernized to the point of efficiency, the
inherent desirability of having the citizen from the community measure human
conduct and pass judgment on it will prevail.
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